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Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment
and Congressional Power
The power of the purse has long been a keystone of the authority
of the legislative branch of government. Recent moves by the President,
however, have encroached on this once secure preserve of the legislative
domain. Congress retains, to be sure, its negative control over the purse
strings, for the Constitution expressly states that "No money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made
by law."' By impounding2 large portions of the funds made available
by the Legislature, however, the President has thrown into question
Congress' affirmative power to provide that money be spent on pro-
grams it enacts.
The practice is not unprecedented, 3 but the impoundments recently
ordered constitute a more serious challenge to Congress' role in spend-
ing decisions, particularly for domestic programs, than any previous
examples. They involve deep cuts and occasional terminations of
selected domestic programs, notably programs originally opposed by
1. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9. There have nonetheless been examples of executive trans.
gression of this negative control. See L. FISHER, PRESIDENT & CONGRESS 127-32 (1972).
2. "Impoundment" is used here to mean the failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type. Federal spending generally involves a two-step process. Funds are
first "obligated," generally through some kind of contractual arrangement, permitting
the project to get underway. At a later time the funds are actually paid out. Before pay-
ment can issue Congress must have passed an appropriation act, whicht empowers an
agency to draw funds from the Treasury. A project can begin-i.e., obligations for it may
be entered into up to a certain specified limit-in advance of appropriation if Congress
has created "obligational authority" or "contract authority" by express provision in the
authorizing legislation. 31 U.S.C. § 627 (1970). Most authorization acts, however, do not
create budget authority themselves; they "authorize to be appropriated" a given amount,
and the appropriations legislation then becomes the vehicle for creating budget author.
ity. The terms are often not employed with precision, and "appropriation" is often used
to mean any kind of budget authority. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(1) (1970).
Impoundment usually takes place at the obligating stage, for once the spending has
become the subject of a contract, it may generally be enforced through the Court of
Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970). Furthermore, appropriations issue as a matter of course
for payments to meet such obligations.
For a general explanation of budget intricacies, see THE FEDERAL BUDGET IN BRIEF, FIS-
CAL YEAR 1974, at 57-60 (1973), and NV. BROWN, Ti FEDERAL BUDGETING AND APPRO'RIA-
TIONS PROCESS 16-31 (1967).
3. See pp. 1644-45 infra. For a brief account of the history of impoundment, see
Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, 15 AD. SC. Q. 361 (1970).
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the President4 or funded at a level beyond his budget recommenda-
tions.5 The impoundments have touched off a flurry of lawsuits6 and
a number of congressional moves toward reasserting control.-
This Note will discuss the central legal question in the controversy,
namely the determination of the limits of executive discretion to with-
hold spending under the Constitution and the relevant statutes. It will
evaluate the justifications which have been put forward to support the
current domestic impoundments, treating in succession the constitu-
tional dimensions of the issue, the import of the particular spending
acts involved, and the impact of legislation, such as the debt ceiling,
that arguably conflicts with the spending statutes. The picture that
emerges is one of broad executive spending discretion created by the
4. For example, impoundment of $6 billion in contract authority under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 2.500, § 207 (Oct. 18.
1972), which passed over a presidential veto. City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 41 U.S.L.W.
2602 (D.D.C. May 8, 1973).
5. For example, in fiscal year 1971, the Administration requested $322 million for the
Rural Electrification Administration. When Congress appropriated $337 million, the
Executive impounded $15 million. See Hearings on S. 373 Before the Ad Hoc Subcounm.
on Impoundment of Funds of the Comm. on Govenennt Operations and the Subcoun n.
on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.. 1st Sms. 628
(1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings]. The selective impoundments carried out last
winter have been expressly described by the Administration as "part of the effort to
hold 1973 federal budget outlays to $250 billion," the level in the President's recom-
mended budget, even though Congress passed a budget of R261 billion. Department of
Agriculture Release, quoted in id. at 596.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in its first report to the Congress
under the Federal Impoundment and Information Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 581c-1 (1973). showed
a total of $8.723 billion impounded as of January 29, 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 3473. 3496
(1973). A portion of this included fairly routine and noncontroversial impoundments
under the Antideficiency Act, see pp. 1642-43 infra. For a large proportion, howeser, the
OMB pointed to no statutory authority, but only referred to "[t]he President's constitti-
tional duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' " 38 Fed. Reg. 3473, 3475
(1973). (This claimed justification is treated in Part III infra.) Further, under a tech-
nicality in the Information Act, no impoundments of contract authority were listed. The
Act only mentions "appropriated" funds, a term which the OMB narrowly construed.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1. Thus the total of impoundments, when the Water
Pollution money is added (see note 4 supra), reaches at least $14 billion.
6. A good collection of the pleadings from much of the current litigation may be
found in 1973 Hearings, supra note 5, at 908-1010. Of those cases that hase been decided
to date, one upheld the President's action, Housing Authority v. Dep't of HUD, 340 F.
Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (housing funds); and the rest found the impoundments un-
warranted, State Highwvay Commission v. Volpe, 41 U.S.L.W. 2539 (8th Cir. Apr. 2, 1973).
aff'g 347 F. Supp. 950 (D. Mo. 1972) (highway funds); Berends v. Butz. 41 U.S.L.W. 2557
(D. Minn. March 20, 1973) (disaster relief loan program); City of New York v. Ruckels-
haus, 41 U.S.L.W. 2602 (D.D.C. May 8, 1973) and Campaign Clean Water v. Ruckelshau%.
41 U.S.L.W. 2675 (E.D. Va. June 5, 1973) (water pollution control grants). Cf. Ameri-
can Federation of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 41 U.S.L.W. 2542 (D.D.C. April 11, 1973)
(in a suit halting dismantlement of the Office of Economic Opportunity, strong dicta
discounting support for the dismantlement based on impoundment power).
7. The Federal Impoundment and Information Act, enacted in 1972, 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 581c-1 (1973) required reports to the Congress of an) impoundment of appropriated
funds. The major bills in the 1973 session are Senator Ernin's S. 373, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), modified and passed by the Senate and sent to the House as a rider to the dollar
devaluation legislation, 119 CoG. Rc. S 6664 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1973), and Representatise
Mahon's H.R. 5193, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
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Congress, but discretion whose bounds have been exceeded by a num-
ber of the current impoundments.
I. Constitutional Sources of Impoundment Power
The executive branch has no authority to engage in spending at all
except pursuant to an act of Congress which either appropriates the
funds or grants the executive branch authority to enter into obliga-
tions.8 In the course of making funds available, Congress may attach
such conditions to the spending as it sees fit," including provisions that
allow the executive the discretion to spend less than all of it. Congress
rarely defines the limits of that discretion explicitly; thus it may be
difficult to ascertain from the ambiguous language generally used what
degree of discretion the Congress has imparted.' 0 Nonetheless, if the
President stays within the bounds of the discretion that Congress in-
tended him to have, no constitutional question arises, for the President
is only exercising powers granted by statute." Examination of the con-
stitutional issue therefore requires the assumption that the particular
legislation involved mandates spending to a degree the Executive
chooses not to implement.
The Constitution itself says nothing about impoundments, but its
few brief references to spending matters cast doubt on the executive
claim to a constitutional impoundment power. Article I provides that
appropriations are to be made by law,' 2 and that all legislative powers
granted are vested in the Congress.'3 Article II directs the President to
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed."' 4 Appropriations laws
are nowhere excepted from this direction.
An executive power to impound would give the President authority
much more extensive than that implicit in an item veto. Where an
Executive has an item veto, his determination that particular spending
is unwise or unwarranted can be overridden by two-thirds of the legis-
lature. Impoundment permits no override.' 5 Since the Constitution
8. 31 U.S.C. § 665(a) (1970); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
9. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127, 129 (1940).
10. See pp. 1645-53 infra.
11. The only possible constitutional question would be whether or not Congress had
made an improper delegation of legislative powers, but overdelegation is decidedly not
the issue in the current impoundment controversy. Cf. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 543 U.S. 579, 655-37 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
12. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 9.
13. Id. § 1.
14. Id. art. II, § 3.
15. Congress was made acutely aware of this when the President Impounded $6 billion
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500
(Oct. 18, 1972), for Congress had already overridden his veto of the Act, and had no
further way to give the Act effect in the face of the impoundment.
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denies the Executive the item veto, a claim to the stronger power must
be viewed with some skepticism.
Nonetheless, the structural argument recurs that the President has
inherent or implied authority to impound by reason of the vesting of
executive power in him' 6 and his duty to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed.17 The Supreme Court considered and expressly
rejected such an argument for broad inherent executive spending dis-
cretion in the 1838 case of Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes s
Postmaster General Kendall had disallowed a claim by Stokes for com-
pensation for carrying the mail. Stokes petitioned Congress for relief,
whereupon Congress passed an act which provided for determination
of the exact amount due Stokes and directed that it be paid. Kendall
paid part of it but impounded the remainder, persisting in his view
that a portion of the amount was not a valid claim. The Court held
that mandamus would issue to compel payment.' 0
The statute involved in Kendall made the congressional mandate
quite specific, naming the recipient and providing for exact determi-
nation of the amount to be spent. The current impoundment contro-
versy does not arise under such tightly drawn spending acts, and spokes-
men for the executive branch have attempted to distinguish Kendall
on that ground.20 The distinction, however, does not have constitu-
tional significance. If the President has no controlling independent
impoundment power when the act is narrowly drawn, it is hard to find
a constitutional provision that would bring such power into being
once the Congress chooses to give the Executive a greater role in the
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
17. Id. § 3. Deputy Attorney General Sneed, whose testimony before the 1973 Senate
Hearings, 1973 Hearings, supra note 5. at 358-402, constitutes the major Administration
statement justifying the latest impoundments, never explicitly put forward a claim to
inherent executive power to impound. But he did strongly suggest its existence at
several points:
Decisions to impound inevitably involve policy judgments concerning changing
national needs and . . . delicate adjustments peculiarly within the competence and
constitutional authority of the Executive branch.
Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
The President's constitutional authority as Chief Executive and his statutory
authority ... give him broad discretion to act in the national interest against fiscal
instability, including the power to impound in appropriate circumstances. Broad
legislative incursions into the area are constitutionallY suspect ....
Id. at 370 (emphasis added).
18. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
19. Id. at 613.
20. E.g., Deputy Attorney General Sneed's testimony, 1973 Hearings, supra note 5,.
at 368. But cf. Memorandum from then Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehn.
quist to Edward L. Morgan, Dec. 1, 1969, reprinted in 1973 Hearings 390 [hereinafter
cited as the Rehnquist Memorandum]. Rehnquist felt that Kendall applied to funds
appropriated for assistance to federally impacted schools, even though tie executihe
branch was granted a definite degree of discretion in setting the standards for entitle-
ment. Id. at 394.
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determination of either recipient or amount.2I Kendall itself strongly
suggests the opposite conclusion, i.e., that Congress may impose tile
spending duty in any manner it sees fit, and the Executive is obliged
faithfully to execute the law by its own terms.
22
There remains another argument for independent, constitutional
authority to impound, founded on an implied executive power in situa-
tions where Congress has not named the recipient or amount. The
argument runs as follows: It is necessarily an executive function to
perform the actual spending itself. Implied in this spending function
is the power and duty to prevent waste, and occasionally that duty will
necessitate impoundment.2 3 Congress usually passes spending acts sev-
eral months before the expenditure is to take place and describes spend-
ing categories in general terms. The executive branch pays out the
funds, however, only with a specific and detailed knowledge of the
conditions prevailing at the appropriate time. The Executive should
have discretion to impound if he can thereby accomplish the pur-
poses of the act more efficiently 24 or if conditions change so as to make
the spending either superfluous or impossible.20 Implied in the power
to spend, this line of argument concludes, is a power to impound for
reasons of economy and efficiency.
20
Such considerations do not apply when the act is ,as specific as that
in Kendall; hence the Kendall holding does not expressly cover this
argument. The Steel Seizure Case,27 however, casts severe doubt on
the notion that the Executive has this limited impoundment power,
21. There may exist some discretion in the latter instance to spend less than the full
amount, but that would be a statutory and not a constitutional power.
22. [I]t would be an alarming doctrine, that Congress cannot impose upon any
executive officer any duty they may think proper, which is not repugnant to any
right secured and protected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and
responsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not to the
direction of the President.
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838).
23. This argument for impoundment as part of an inherent power to prevent waste
was advanced by Deputy Attorney General Sneed, 1973 Hearings, supra note 5, at 366.
But see discussion of the Antideficiency Act, pp. 1650-51 infra.
24. The classic example of this type of impoundment occurred where Congress
appropriated one million dollars for the control of the Mediterranean fruit fly, but the
Executive was able to accomplish the task for $500,000. Williams, The Impounding of
Funds by the Bureau of the Budget, INTER-UNIVERSITY CASE PROGRAMt No. 28 (1955), re-
printed in 1973 Hearings, supra note 5, at 844, 845.
25. President Jefferson's often-cited impoundment falls in this category. He failed to
spend money for gunboats on the Mississippi River because the Louisiana Purchase
intervened, making both banks American territory. 1 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS 360-61 (1897).
26. It is important to note that this argument at its strongest only establishes a lim-
ited kind of impoundment power for the Executive, the power to impound when con-
ditions intrinsic to the program indicate that further spending would be wasteful. There
is no principle that would indicate that the President must necessarily have all impound.
ment powers or none at all.
27. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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no matter how sensible it may seem, unless supported by congressional
enactment. In the course of holding that executive authority to seize
the mills did not exist, Justice Black, writing for the Court, empha-
sized that Congress has "exclusive constitutional authority to make
laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Con-
stitution 'in the Government of the United States, or any Department
or Officer thereof.' "28 Executive authority not expressly granted by
the Constitution, the Court indicated, can be nothing but the creature
of statute, and as such, the power can extend no further than the lim-
its expressed in any statute that creates it.
Although Justice Black's majority opinion does not leave room for
any inherent or implied executive powers, there remains the possibility
that his statement is not conclusive on the impoundment question.
The actual holding of the case may turn instead on the cautious and
narrow reasoning found in the concurring opinions,20 particularly
those of Justices Jackson3" and Frankfurter.3' Nonetheless, even under
the concurrences, the notion of implied executive impoundment power
must be rejected.
The concurring justices leave open the question of executive author-
ity in a field wherein Congress has not acted. But when Congress has
dealt by statute with the particular matter or power in question, the
President has no inherent power to go outside the procedures and
powers Congress has provided.2 The statutes in the Steel Seizure Case
were found sufficient to cover the field even though none of them
expressly denied the President all other seizure power.33
Congress has likewise covered the field of impoundments to effect
economies in the Antideficiency Act,34 as amended in 1951. The meas-
28. Id. at 588-89, quoting US. CONsr. art. I, § 8. Cf. Brandeis, J., dissenting in Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 246-47 (1926):
There is no express grant to the President of incidental powers resembling those
conferred upon Congress by clause 18 of Article I, § 8. A power implied on the
ground that it is inherent in the executive, must, according to established principles
of constitutional construction, be limited to "the least possible power adequate to
the end proposed." . . . The end to which the President's efforts are to be directed
is . . . the faithful execution of the laws consistent with the provisions therefor
made by Congress.
29. See, e.g., the analysis of the case in Kauper, The Steel Sei:ure Case: Congress, The
President, 9- the Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REV. 141, 174-78 (1952).
30. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952).
31. Id. at 593.
32. Id. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring). Cf. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170
(1804), relied on by Justice Clark in his concurring opinion in the Steel Sei:ure Case,
343 U.S. at 660-61.
34. 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970). Earlier versions of the Antideficiency Act, passed in 1905
and 1906, provided that executive officials were to apportion appropriations to assure
that the funds lasted for the full period of time for which they were intended, thus
preventing the need for deficiency appropriations. 33 Stat. 1257 (1905); 34 Stat. 49 (1906).
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ure resulted from a 1947 recommendation by the Bureau of the Budg-
et 35 that Congress give the Bureau specific statutory authority to fall
short of full spending whenever conditions in the program made sav-
ings possible. The Antideficiency Act has been cited by Administration
spokesmen in the current debate as the "most explicit authority for
withholding appropriated funds." 30 The statement is true as far as it
goes, but a reading of the Act makes clear that it gives no support to
the impoundments currently in controversy.
The Antideficiency Act provides, in relevant part, that the executive
branch shall so apportion appropriations as to assure that they last for
the full period of time for which they were intended by Congress. 1
It then grants limited impoundment power to provide for contingen-
cies or to effect savings whenever there are changes in requirements,
greater efficiency of operations, or other developments subsequent to
the date on which the appropriation was made available.38
Read in context, the provision contemplates only the savings made
possible by changes and developments intrinsic to the program itself,30
not to broader changes in executive policy. 40 The test of any impound-
ment under the Act remains the capacity to carry out the purposes of
the appropriation, not the purposes the Executive might have in mind
with regard to the appropriation.
41
The legislative history of the Act bolsters this narrow reading of the
impoundment power therein granted. The Bureau of the Budget re-
port from which the section derived had pointed out that the author-
ity "must be exercised with considerable care in order to avoid usurp-
ing the powers of Congress. '42 The committee report that accompanied
35. Report and Recommendations by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and
the Comptroller General of the United States with respect to the Antideficiency Act and
Related Legislation and Procedures, June 5, 1947, quoted in 1973 Hearings, supra note 5,
at 398.
36. Caspar W. Weinberger, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, in
Hearings on Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds Before the Subeonun. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 95
(1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings].
37. 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(1) (1970).
38. 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2) (1970).
39. See statement of the Comptroller General, 1973 Hearings, supra note 5, at 110.
40. If impoundments are based (as the current ones evidently are) on executive policy
that has not changed, they cannot draw support from the Antideficiency Act, for its
provisions apply only to developments subsequent to the date of passage of the spending
act. 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2) (1970). Conditions or presidential objections in existence at the
time of passage were presumptively before the Congress when it made its determination.
41. Whenever it is determined by [the apportioning officer] . . . that any amount
will not be required to carry out the purposes of the appropriation concerned, he
shall recommend the rescission of such amount . ...
31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2) (1970) (emphasis added).
42. Cited in 1973 Hearings, supra note 5, at 110.
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the Act echoed that admonition: "There is no warrant or justification
for the thwarting of a major policy of Congress by the impounding of
funds." 43 Many of the current impoundments thus fall outside the
scope of the Antideficiency Act.44
If Justice Black's statement of inherent powers doctrine is con-
trolling, then the power to impound to effect economies exists only
because of the Antideficiency Act. On the other hand, if the concur-
rences control, the Executive's impoundment authority is still delim-
ited, because the Act covers the impoundment field and provides the
Executive all the impoundment power necessary for his execution of
spending without being wasteful.45
This limiting iole for the Antideficiency Act must still be tested,
however, against two possible qualifications of the Sieel Seizure hold-
ing:4 there may be greater latitude for presidential action in emer-
gency conditions, or when a pattern of congressional acquiescence in-
dicates that a certain power is widely considered inherent in the Ex-
ecutive.
Some of the concurring opinions suggest the possibility of powers
inherent in the Executive to cope with a pressing emergency.47 The
emergency that calls such powers into play, however, would have to
be greater than that found wanting in the Sleel Seizure Case. There
the Korean War was underway, and there was a direct link between
the war effort and the threatened halt in steel production.
There are suggestions that the current use of the impoundment
power rests on a kind of fiscal emergency: the threat of runaway infla-
tion. 48 There is, however, ample time to recommend to Congress meas-
43. H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 311 (1950).
44. The 1973 OMB report to Congress on impoundments makes this point quite
plainly, for the Act is not cited as authority for fully one-fourth the listed reserves. 38
Fed. Reg. at 3474-94 (1973).
45. Cf. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65.66 (1924). The Court found that
Congress had the authority to regulate a power indisputably inherent in a coordinate
branch of the government-the power of the federal courts to punish contempits-so long
as the power was not rendered inoperative nor any of its essential attributes abrogated.
Thus even if we assume the power to impound in order to spend economically were
inherent in the Executive, the Antideficiency Act is still, by analogy to Michaeison, a
valid exercise by Congress of its authority to regulate and channel the impoundment-
for-efficiency power, since the Act abrogates none of its essential attributes. Impound-
ments outside the limited scope of the Act would still be unwarranted.
46. These qualifications reflect the concurring Justices' efforts, see notes 47 and 51
infra, to bring coherence to the doctrine of inherent and implied powers. Prior cases
often cited in support of a broad view of inherent executive power include Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915);
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890); United States v. Russell,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
47. See 343 U.S. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 659 (Burton. J., concurring);
1d. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring). But cf. id. at 652 (Jackson, J., concurring).
48. Deputy Attorney General Sneed suggests a fiscal emergency in 1973 Hearings,
supra note 5, at 367.
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ures for dealing with whatever emergency exists, measures such as
rescission of the appropriations that exacerbate the crisis. Given these
possibilities, an emergency that would call for executive action against
the will of Congress exists only if one assumes some inherent disability
on the part of Congress to deal with this type of crisis. 40 The assumption
is hardly a tenable foundation for executive power. The Executive
may well not like the way Congress chooses to deal with what it views
as an emergency, but the result, even if it means a higher rate of in-
flation, must rest squarely on the shoulders of Congress. The Consti-
tution nowhere suggests that fiscal emergencies have constitutional sig-
nificance.50
If Congress has consistently acquiesced in impoundments, and if
impoundment constitutes a systematic, unbroken executive practice,
then perhaps its action would suggest that the power is inherent in the
Executive. 51 This doctrine traces to United States v. Midwest Oil Co.," '
a case in which the Supreme Court upheld the action of the President
in withdrawing mineral-rich lands from possible staking of claims,
despite an act of Congress stating that they should remain available
to the public. 53 The Court found 282 examples of similar unprotested
withdrawals over the previous fifty years, and concluded that the Ex-
ecutive thus had inherent power to do so.
There are examples of presidential impoundments tracing back to
the 'presidency of Thomas Jefferson.54 The bulk of them were minor
or temporary, carried out for reasons of economy and efficiency, and
now are expressly covered by the Antideficiency Act.", Most of the
remainder were impoundments of military spending, wherein the
President arguably draws on his powers as Commander-in-Chief. 0
49. Some Administration statements seem to put forward such a claim. Id. at 369.
50. There is at least a suggestion in the Constitution that a military emergency does
have such status. See, e.g., U.S. ConsT. art I § 10. The impoundments of domestic funds
carried out during World War II thus would have a stronger claim to a constitutional
justification than the current impoundments. See p. 1645 infra.
51. See 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
52. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
53. There was a decided element of emergency in the Midwest Oil case as well, for
the lands were being claimed at such a pace that the President felt he could not remain
inactive while waiting for Congress to change the law. He expressly issued his order
"in aid of proposed legislation." Id. at 467.
54. See note 25 supra. See also Memorandum by Joseph Cooper, Analysis of Alleged
1803 Precedent for Impoundment Practice in Nixon Administration, reprinted in 1973
Hearings, supra note 5, at 676-77.
55. 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2) (1970).
56. See Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, 15 AD. Sci. Q. 361, 366.69 (1970).
Despite the war powers claim to impoundment authority, military impoundments are
also open to serious challenge. Davis, Congressional Power to Require Defense Expendi.
tures, 44 FORIHAM L. REV. 39 (1964); Stassen, Separation of Powers and the Uncommon
Defense: The Case Against Impounding of Weapons System Appropriations, 57 Gao. L.J.
1159 (1969).
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Occasionally impoundments have occurred under express direction of
Congress that a given amount of cuts be made."7 Perhaps the closest
parallel to the current impoundments was the action taken by Presi-
dent Roosevelt during World War II in halting numerous domestic
projects for which Congress had provided funding."s That action was
hotly disputed by several congressmen, but it was always closely linked
to the emergency needs of the nation during a declared war. Past im-
poundments are thus distinguishable from the current round of domes-
tic impoundments; there has been no unbroken executive practice of
that character.
Even if one were to treat all past impoundments as a single un-
divided category,59 another element of the argument fails. Impound-
ments have rarely passed without considerable congressional question-
ing and protest.00 Nor have all Presidents systematically claimed the
authority. President Kennedy expressly denied that he had such
power.0 1 President Nixon himself has taken actions inconsistent with
a claim to inherent impoundment power. For example, he vetoed a
spending bill in 1970 giving as his reason that it would have prevented
him from impounding any of the funds, -2 thus intimating that im-
poundment is a statutory and not a constitutional power. He also con-
tinues to seek congressional rescission of some appropriated amounts0 3
an obviously superfluous action if the President has inherent power
to refuse to follow a congressional spending mandate. Thus no widely
accepted and continuing practice has established impoundment as a
power inherent in the Executive.
II. Construing the Spending Statutes
After Congress mandates spending, the President has no independent
power to refuse to spend. But Congress has not always made its intent
57. Fisher, supra note 56, at 370.
58. See Williams, supra note 24.
59. There appear to be no clear guidelines for how large or small one makes the rele-
vant categories. The Midwest Oil decision itself provoked a dissent which differed from
the Court's opinion primarily in finding the 282 prior examples to be in distinguishable
categories and hence no precedent for the President's action. 236 U.S. 459, 42 (1915)
(Day, J., dissenting).
60. M. Ramsey, Impoundment by the Executive Department of Funds Which Con-
gress Has Authorized It to Spend or Obligate, May 10, 1968 (Library of Congress, Legis-
lative Reference Service), in 1971 Hearings, supra note 36, at 291, 292-95.
61. In response to a proposal by the Civil Rights Commission that he impound gov-
ernment money that would go to institutions practicing racial discrimination, President
Kennedy said: "I don't have the power to cut off the aid in a general way . .. and
I think it would probably be unwise to give the President of the United States that kind
of power .... N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1963, at 11, col. 5.
62. Wall St. J., June 23, 1970, at 5, cols. 2-4.
63. As of February, 1973, rescissions currently being sought totalled over q382 million.
5 NAT'L J. 237 (1973).
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clear with respect to the extent of spending it mandates, and thus the
degree of impoundment it intends to permit. The spending acts charac-
teristically employ ambiguous language, words like "authorize" and
"appropriate," rather than the language of clear mandate such as "re-
quire" or "direct." The Executive is bound faithfully to execute these
laws; to do so he must construe the ambiguous language.
The courts have evolved a body of doctrine to aid in statutory con-
struction, the cardinal rule of which is "to give effect to the intent
of Congress. ' 64 These judicially-developed standards should guide con-
struction by the Executive, but two complementary theories have been
put forward which challenge their relevance. The theories suggest
that the standards either do not control the executive or that they do
not apply to spending legislation. Both have been advanced in the
current debate, and under either the President would be to some extent
exempt from the duty of carefully effectuating the legislative intent
when he executes the laws.
A. Different Standards Control the Executive: The Loophole Theory
Some observers and participants in the current impoundment debate
have urged that the Executive has broad discretion to construe the
applicable statute in any fashion as long as he does not clearly and
obviously contradict the specific language employed.05 As long as the
President has a "colorable argument"06 that the statute does not man-
date the spending, he is free to exercise his discretion as to whether
to impound or not. If Congress thus wishes to make particular spend-
ing mandatory, it must do so in absolutely unambiguous terms. Am-
biguity is, in effect, a loophole.
This theory received striking expression in the government brief in
the recent case of State Highway Commission v. Volpe,0 7 but the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected it and held the impound-
ment invalid. The Department of Transportation impounded High-
way Trust Fund moneys as part of the Administration's fight against
inflation, despite a provision in the authorization act stating the sense
of the Congress that no sums be impounded.0 8 Because Congress did
64. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940).
65. See, e.g., Kranz, A 20th Century Emancipation Proclamation: Presidential Powers
Permit Witholding of Funds from segregated Institutions, 11 AM. U.L. REv. 48, 60
(1962); Deputy Attorney General Joseph Snecd, 1973 Hearings, supra note 5, at 367: Pro.
fessor Ralph Winter, 1971 Hearings, supra note 36, at 273; Secretary Caspar Weinberger,
id. at 143.
66. The phrase is Professor Winter's, 1971 Hearings, supra note 36, at 273.
67. 41 U.S.L.W. 2539 (8th Cir. Apr. 2, 1973).
68. 23 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970).
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not say baldly that "no funds shall be impounded," the Assistant Attor-
ney General asserted that there was no mandate to spend.00 The court
itself might not have construed the spending act as a grant of such
broad discretion if it had the issue before it de novo; rather the Gov-
ernment's position was that the Executive's construction should be
allowed to stand because it was not outside the bounds of all possible
constructions of the Act.
This kind of argument hardly betokens faithful execution of the
laws. But even if it is meant as a call for judicial restraint-that is, for
upholding executive construction in all cases except where there is
clear contravention of express language-it still misstates the usual role
the courts have played. Provided that the case is justiciable,' 0 con-
struction of a statute remains a decidedly judicial function, and the
reviewing court's construction will prevail over tie administrative
interpretation.7 1 When the sense of the Congress is described in a
section of the statute itself, that section provides a solid indication of
the congressional intent the courts will uphold3 2 The courts do not
view ambiguous words as loopholes or restrict the search for the con-
gressional intent to the single phrase or provision involved.7
The "loophole theory" actually amounts to an overly broad appli-
cation of a rationality standard employed in judicial review of execu-
tive actions. The 1971 case of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. VolpeT 4 illustrates the standard's proper use. The plaintiffs sued to
enjoin the building of an expressway through Overton Park in Mem-
phis, Tennessee, relying on a provision in the Highway Act that ex-
pressways could be routed through parkland only if the Secretary of
Transportation found that there was no "feasible" alternative route.
The Government urged a possible construction of the statute under
69. Brief for the Appellants, reprinted in 1973 Hearings, supra note 5, at 952, 963.
70. Asserted nonjusticiability of impoundment issues receives heavy reliance by the
Administration. See Testimony of Deputy Attorney General Sneed, 1973 Hearings, supra
note 5, at 383.
One impoundment case was in fact dismissed partly on the ground that judicially dis.
coverable and manageable standards resolving the issue were lacking. Housing Authority
v. Dep't of H.U.D., 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The dismissal may have occurred
because the plaintiff had framed the issue by charging that the impoundment insolved
was an unconstitutional item veto. There may not be manageable standards for dis.
tinguishing an item veto from an impoundment, but there are well.developed judicial
standards for construing statutes. See pp. 1650-53 & note 102 infra.
71. Woods v. Benson Hotel Corp., 177 F.2d 543. 546 (8th Cir. 1949).
72. [W]hile it is true that administrative interpretations and regulations are to be
accorded great weight by the courts in construing statutes because of the superior
knowledge of administrative officers of administrative needs, we cannot construe a
regulation so as to defeat the intent of Congress ....
United States v. Colfax Grain Growers, 157 F.2d 633, 635-36 (9th Cir. 1946).
73. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 386 (1948).
74. 401 US. 402 (1971).
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which the Secretary's contested action was entirely valid, but the
Supreme Court did not accept it and instead remanded the case, direct-
ing that the reviewing court consider whether the Secretary properly
construed his authority and properly interpreted the congressional
standards for "feasibility." 75 After the correct construction has been
established, "the Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of
regularity," 70 and the court need only find that he "could have reason-
ably believed that in this case there are no feasible alternatives." 7 The
Secretary of Transportation's construction of the key statutory term,
"feasible," however, is not entitled to be judged by this rationality
standard; only his application of the statute, once it has been fairly
construed to determine the actual legislative intent, is to be so judged71
B. Different Standards Apply to Spending Acts:
The Presumptively Perinissive Theory
The statement that an appropriation is permissive rather than man-
datory70 has commonly been made during the course of the current
debate.80 The assertion is accurate when used in a general descriptive
sense, for historically nearly all spending acts have been cast in lan-
guage ihat * would permit the spending of less than the maximum
amount .made available. But frequently executive branch spokesmen
have elevated the statement to a presumption that appropriations are
permissive in the broadest sense, permitting full executive discretion-
a presumption which is then applied to the construction of spending
acts. 8 ' If such a presumption exists, then the task of statutory con-
struction is relatively simple. One need only look to see if the statute
75. Id. at 416.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Cf. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), where the Court undertook close review
of an administrative construction of the applicable statute even though the statute also
granted the official involved, the Secretary of Agriculture, broad discretionary authority
to "prescribe such regulations, as he may deem proper."
79. Miller, Presidential Power to Impound Appropriated Funds: An Exercise in
Constitutional Decision-Making, 43 N.C.L. REV. 502, 511-12 (1965).
80. See, e.g., Statement of Deputy Attorney General Sneed, 1973 Hearings, supra note
5, at 367.
81. "This history compels the conclusion that if the Congress wishes to mandate
full spending for a particular program, it must do so in unmistakably clear terms." Id.
When the presumption is thus directly stated, it is usually qualified, as it is by the
word "full" here. As stated, it means nothing more than a presumption that the Execu.
tive could not be faulted for spending less than every dollar in the appropriation. But
as applied by executive branch spokesmen, the presumption generally shifts toward per.
missiveness in the broader sense, that the Executive cannot be faulted for spending
at whatever level he chooses below the prescribed ceiling. See, e.g., tile use of the pre-
sumption in Attorney General Clark's opinion, note 82 infra. There is only a sutle
difference in the two senses of "permissive," but it is a highly significant one.
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contains unmistakably clear mandatory language. If not, then the
President's impoundment action cannot be said to be a violation of
the statute; Congress presumptively intended him to have full discre-
tion. The act would then carry no mandatory force at all, except to set
a ceiling on such spending as the Executive chooses to exercise.
This view was first developed at length in an opinion 2-' rendered by
then Attorney General Ramsey Clark on impoundments of highway
funds. s3 A commentators4 recently examined closely the judicial and
congressional support asserted in the opinion and found that it rested
largely on dicta in cases where the result would suggest an opposite
conclusion or on statements quoted out of context from congressional
sources.sa Furthermore, its conclusion-that the highway find im-
poundments were valid-was repudiated in State Highway Commis-
sion v. Volpe. 6
If the legal foundations for the presumption are shaky, its practical
consequences for future congressional action must provide a final indi-
cation of its invalidity. Congress ordinarily uses ambiguous or per-
missive language, language less than strictly mandatory, because it
wants to encourage economy.87 "Permissive" language grants the Ex-
ecutive a degree of flexibility in order to cope with circumstances that
may change significantly between the time of congressional enactment
and actual spending.88 To establish a presumption that such language
carries no mandatory force whatsoever is to assume, in effect, that the
congressional intent with respect to any particular program was never
stronger than a mere desire to enable the program up to a certain man-
82. 42 Op. ATr'y G.v. 32 (1967), reprinted in 1973 Hearings 872.
83. Federal Highway Act of 1956, 23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970).
84. Stassen, Separation of Powers and the Uncommon Defense: The Case Against Ins-
pounding of Weapons System Appropriations, 57 GEO. L.J. 1159, at 1181 n.l17 (1969).
85. Id. at 1182 n.1lS.
86. 41 U.S.L.W. 2539 (8th Cir. Apr. 2, 1973). Congress had added its scnse-of-the-
Congress provision after the Clark opinion was rendered, 23 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970). see
p. 1646 supra; thus the court did not have before it exnactly the same statute to con-
strue. Nonetheless, it placed its main emphasis in construction on 23 U.S.C. § 101(b),
the provision the Attorney General had found inadequate to overcome the presumed
permissiveness.
87. This is not to suggest that economy is always the conscious objective which
underlies, for example, the choice of the word "authorize" instead of "direct" or "require."
Rather, in ordinary times when programs receive reasonably full implementation with-
out the stricter language, there is simply little merit in risking a reduction in flexibility
by language that might seem to require the spending of every dollar in the appropriation.
88. See the interchange between Senator Nfuskie and William Ruckelsbaus. Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency, with regard to the $46 billion in contract
authority impounded under the 1972 Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, in 1973
Hearings, supra note 5, at 406-09. Efforts to write flexibility into the language of the
appropriations bill itself are not entirely necessary. A good deal of administrative flexi-
bility attaches to all spending acts by virtue of the Antideficiency Act. See pp. 1650-51
infra.
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datory ceiling. Put another way, Congress' desire to promote flexibility
in administration became a trap for it, disabling Congress from carry-
ing out its true intent. Further, if that intent remains a desire to
mandate even the bare existence of a particular program, Congress can
do so only at the cost of all flexibility of administration, by imposing
language that requires the spending of every dollar and eliminates
executive discretion.
Spending acts are permissive rather than mandatory, then, only in
the sense that they commonly do not mandate the spending of every
dollar made available.80 To determine whether they permit such a
sweeping exercise of executive discretion as that embodied in the cur-
rent round of impoundments, however, requires careful construction
of the particular statutes involved. It cannot be answered by pre-
sumption.
C. Fairly Construing the Spending Statutes
There is little indication that the current impoundments have been
animated by the guiding principle of statutory construction-the ascer-
tainment of legislative intent.0° In seeking more detailed guidance for
the construction of individual spending acts, a useful starting point is
the Antideficiency Act.01 Under the familiar principle that statutes
in pari materia are to be construed together, 2 that Act, written to
apply generally to all appropriations, may properly be viewed as setting
the context for construction.0
It directs that economies are to be made whenever possible.0 4 It is
not sufficient, however, that the Executive simply declare that a cer-
tain impoundment provides for.savings, for in one sense, all impound-
ments result in savings; rather, the savings must grow out of conditions
inherent to the program itself.oa The Act makes clear that the Execu-
tive remains responsible for carrying out the purposes of the appropria-
89. See Stassen, supra note 84, at 1182 n.119.
90. Craig v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1005, 1008 (5th Cir. 1970).
91. 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970). See pp. 1641-43 supra.
92. United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940).
93. Congressional passage of Senator Ervin's S. 373 as modified, supra note 7, would
create a more precisely defined context for construction of spending statutes. Under S.
373 Congress gets a second chance to clarify its intent in light of circumstances as they
have developed since the time of enactment, with the presumption against the validity
of the impoundment. The bill requires that all impoundments be reported to the Comp.
troller General, who is to determine whether an impoundment falls within the terms of
the Antideficiency Act. Routine withholdings covered by the Act are not made subject
to congressional review. 119 CoNe. Rac. S. 6664 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1973).
94. See H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1950).
95. See note 39 supra.
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tion,9 6 not his own purposes for the program. The task of construction,
seen in this light, is simply to ascertain the purposes of the spending
act and whether they are being fulfilled.
In practice the application of these standards for construction obvi-
ously will not result in a precise lower limit to executive spending,
the way a precise upper limit appears. The mandatory force of the
spending act will take shape only in the course of litigation challenging
a given impoundment. The court need not seek to derive some lower
figure but need simply test the contested impoundment against the
legislative intent as expressed in the act to determine whether the
impoundment was an abuse of discretion.07 It will derive its own con-
struction of the statute, then test the administrative action to see
whether it could rationally be a carrying out of the Act's mandate.us
This will be a case-by-case process, but a few generalizations can be
made which indicate that a number of the current impoundments are
indeed violations of a statutory mandate.
Impoundments that result in the termination of a program should
rarely be upheld, since the legislature, in passing appropriations or
creating contract authority, mandates at least the existence of the pro-
gram. The termination of the Rural Environmental Assistance Pro-
gram,99 the cancelling of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal,100 and the
failure to build a national aquarium,1 0 ' have thus all been invalid
impoundments.
Partial impoundments are more difficult to judge, because appro-
priations acts rarely mandate spending of every dollar and because
executive action will be tested by the relatively generous rationality
standard. The more an act uses language of a strongly permissive char-
acter, such as "not to exceed" or "may" rather than "shall," the more
likely it is that the executive action falls within the discretion
granted.102
On the other hand, the Antideficiency Act'0 3 may be taken to mean
96. 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2) (1970). See H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1950).
97. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(l)(A) (1970).
98. See pp. 1647-48 supra on the application of the rationality standard.
99. Announcement of termination in 1973 Hearings, supra note 5. at 585.
100. This impoundment is currently being challenged in Canal Authority v. Resor.
No. 71-92-CIV-J (M.D. Fla., filed Feb. 12, 1971). Pleadings reprinted in 1973 Hearings,
supra note 5, at 912.
101. 1971 Hearings, supra note 36, at 211-17.
102. Housing Authority v. Dep't of H.U.D., 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972), see
note 6 supra, was dismissed largely because the authorization act used highly permissive
language. It read in part: "The Secretary may, with the approval of the President. con-
tract to make grants under this subchapter aggregating not to exceed $7.600.000,000"
(emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (1970).
103. 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970).
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that Congress generally expects that the program will be fully imple-
mented unless some good reason, intrinsic to the program and arising
after appropriation is made, dictates otherwise. Furthermore, there are
in many acts other affirmative indications of congressional intent that
would place a heavier burden on the Executive to show that he is ful-
filling the legislative will. These include:
Congressional assignment of high priority to the program. In the
Federal Highway Act of 1956 Congress declared that "It is ...in the
national interest to accelerate the construction of the Federal-aid high-
way systems."' 04 Since impoundments of highway funds slow construc-
tion, they are generally invalid.
Sense-of-the-Congress provisions that no impoundment take place.
Although such provisions are often classed as merely hortatory, in the
context of a spending act they provide a clear indication of the con-
gressional intent which the executive branch must carry out. By this
standard also, the highway fund impoundments are invalid.10,
Specific mandatory language. Portions of an act may be undeniably
mandatory. For example, § 205 of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972 states in relevant part: "(a) Sums author-
ized to be appropriated.., shall be allotted by the Administrator [by a
given date] .... (b)(1) Any sums allotted to a State under subsection
(a) shall be available for obligation ...on and after the date of such
allotment."'' 0 The impoundment of $6 billion in contract authority
provided by the Act has resulted in the Administrator's standing in
direct violation of these provisions. For that reason, a federal district
court recently held the impoundment unwarranted, and ordered allot-
ment. 07
Formula grant programs. When Congress grants the executive branch
only a minimum of discretion in judging whether proposed projects
meet standards defined by statute for entitlement to a grant, it becomes
the Executive's duty to make the funds available to those that qualify.
Impoundment under such circumstances would be an unwarranted
extension of the discretion narrowly circumscribed.' 08 Note that ex-
penditure might still fall well below the ceiling authorized if fewer
104. 23 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970).
105. 23 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970).
106. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500
(Oct. 18, 1972).
107. City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 41 U.S.L.W. 2602 (D.D.C. May 8, 1973). Cf.
Campaign Clean Water v. Ruckelshaus, 41 U.S.L.W. 2675 (E.D. Va. June 5, 1973).
108. The Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 20, expressed a similar view. 1973 Hear.
ings, supra note 5, at 390-95.
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projects than anticipated meet the standards, but the Executive is not
empowered to decree that result beforehand.
Other sources. Various other indicators might aid a court in deter-
mining the congressional intent under the given spending act. The
legislative history'0 9 and the relevant committee reports often indicate
the sense of priority Congress attaches to the project. The fact that the
act passed over a presidential veto, 10 or that Congress in recent years
had reappropriated to the project all sums previously impounded"1
would also be relevant data in assessing that priority.
Congress plainly intends that some "lower limit" mandates exist.
The usual standards of statutory construction provide sufficient
grounds for executive derivation of them in order to see that the
spending laws are faithfully executed, and also enable the judicial
system to hear and decide impoundment cases.
III. Construing All the Statutes
There remains one other asserted justification for the current im-
poundments. The claim derives from the President's duty to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed";"112 its proponents argue that
regardless of the mandate that may appear from a particular spending
act, the Constitution vests responsibility in the President to faithfully
execute all the laws. Some other statutes Congress has passed, they
argue, especially the Employment Act of 1946,113 the Economic Stabili-
zation Act," 4 and the statutory debt ceiling,& " conflict with the duty
to spend that would appear from the spending act alone. Congress has
sent out contradictory signals, and in order to harmonize them, the
President is empowered to impound funds. Closer examination reveals,
109. See Woods v. Benson Aotel Corp., 177 F.2d 543, 546 (8th Cir. 1949); Bercnds v.
Butz, 41 U.S.L.W. 2557 (D. Minn. March 20, 1973).
110. For example, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. Pub. L
No. 92-500 (Oct. 18, 1972). A district court recently found the veto override significant in
its determination that the impoundment of water pollution funds was an abuse of dis-
cretion. Campaign Clean Water v. Ruckelshaus, 41 US.LWA. 2675 (E.D. Va. June 5. 1973).
111. For example, money for the Rural Electrification Administration's Two-Percent
Loan Program was consistently reappropriated after impoundment. See H.R. REt,. No.
92-1175, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972).
112. This claim was pressed most forcefully by Deputy Attorney General Sneed in
1973 Hearings, supra note 5, at 368. It was also advanced by Secretary Weinberger in
1971 Hearings, supra note 36, at 101.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1021 et seq. (1970).
114. Economic Stabilization Act of 1971, 85 Stat. 743 (codified in note to 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1904 (1973)).
115. Pub. L. No. 92-599, § 101 (Oct. 27, 1972), which increased tem porarily the per-
manent ceiling, 31 U.S.C. § 757b (Supp. 1, 1971). from $400 billion to $465 billion. The
temporary ceiling was recently extended to November 30, 1973. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1973,
at 1, col. 7.
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however, that the conflict is more apparent than real, gnd provides no
support for the impoundments that have been carried out.
It is important to note this claim is not fundamentally constitutional
although it rests on a clause of the Constitution. The argument, rather,
is based on construction of the statutes. It would be within the power
of Congress to take away the executive power asserted either through
outright repeal of the conflicting acts or amendment of the acts so
that they no longer clash with the signals Congress sends through
spending legislation. Further, since this remains an issue of statutory
construction, the President still must apply the judicially-developed
standards for construction. Numerous cases have dealt with the asser-
tion that a conflict in the statutes makes for implied amendment or
repeal of one of them. 116 The courts, however, have emphasized that
implied repeal of a statute is not favored, 1 7 and the governing criterion
remains the legislative intent.118 Effect should be given to both statutes
if at all possible."19 Only if the conflict between the two acts is un-
avoidable can the power to refuse to execute the one be inferred,120
and that power exists only with respect to the precise point of con-
flict.' 2' Even an unavoidable conflict does not give the President un-
bounded authority to choose which of the acts he will execute, for it is
established that the later act will take precedence. 22 By the light of
these standards the arguably conflicting acts themselves may be ex-
amined.
A. The Employment Act of 1946
The portion of the Employment Act cited as a foundation for im-
poundment power reads:
The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy and respon-
sibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means
consistent with its needs and obligations and other essential con-
siderations of national policy ... to promote maximum employ-
ment, production, and purchasing power.123
116. See, e.g., Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497 (1936); United States v. 24
Cans Containing Butter, 148 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1945).
117. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
118. Id.
119. Id. See also Sevin v. Inland Waterways Corp., 88 F.2d 988, 990 (5th Cir. 1937).
120. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497 (1936).
121. Id.
122. Id. See also United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 127 F.2d 907, 912 (7th Cir. 19,12).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1021 (1970), cited by Deputy Attorney General Sneed, 1973 Hearings,
supra note 5, at 366.
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The reference to purchasing power permits the Administration to
assert that it is only giving effect through impoundment to a con-
gressionally declared policy of fighting inflation. 2
4 But if Congress
meant in the Employment Act to direct the President to achieve that
goal by impounding whatever funds he felt were unessential, it seems
likely that it would have made the empowerment explicit. Even as a
policy statement, this section can hardly be read to declare that the
fight against inflation is to take precedence over any other aim of
national policy, much less over other specific legislation.
Perhaps more importantly, this section is only the preamble. The
body of the Act creates the Council of Economic Advisers and provides
that the President" is to make an annual economic report.12 5 Under
these operative sections of the Act, the President is explicitly given the
far more limited role of making "such recommendations for legislation
as he may deem necessary or desirable" to give effect to the policy.' 26
In sum, nothing in the Employment Act necessarily conflicts with any
given spending act. And even if by some construction the conflict were
found inescapable, the more recent spending act would have to control.
B. The Economic Stabilization Act
The Economic Stabilization Act seems at first glance to take up
where the Employment Act left off. It states more directly the national
policy of fighting inflation,12 7 and specifically gives broad powers to
the President to achieve that goal by "issu[ing] such orders as he deems
appropriate ... [to] stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries." 12 8 The
President obviously believes his impoundment orders serve that end
by means of reducing the overall level of federal expenditures, and the
text of the Act itself does not state that impoundment orders cannot
be among those he deems appropriate. However, the very breadth of
the language led to a serious challenge against the Act in Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Connally,29 where the plaintiff union charged that it
amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. In
order to uphold its constitutionality, the court was forced to construe
the language narrowly, leaning heavily for its derivation of standards
on the nation's past experience with wage-price stabilization programs
124. Id. at 366-67.
125. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1022-25 (1970).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(4) (1970).
127. Economic Stabilization Act of 1971, § 202, 85 Stat. 743 (codified in note to 12
U.S.C.A. § 1904 (1973)).
128. Id. at § 203(a).
129. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
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and on the legislative history of the Act. 130 Without defining precisely
the outer limits of the power therein granted, the opinion strongly
suggests that the Act is only a grant to the President of authority to
impose wage-price controls. If the President were to use the Act as
explicit authority as well for impoundment of all manner of federal
expenditures, it is unlikely that the Act as then applied could survive
a similar challenge. There is nothing either in the historical experi-
ence or the legislative history to suggest that such a power lies within
the bounds of the congressional intent.'
3 '
Thus construed, the Act does not conflict with spending legislation,
except perhaps in the limited circumstance where a control order coin-
cides with an act that provides for government pay raises. Such a con-
flict led to an impoundment in 1971 because Congress had passed a
military pay raise just before the President implemented the wage-
price freeze.' 32 Since his impoundment there was only incidental to
the establishment of across-the-board controls, and since Congress did
intend for the President, to have authority for a freeze that would affect
equitably all sectors of the economy, 133 there was some justification for
this action. Whatever the propriety of that particular impoundment, it
establishes no principle broad enough to justify those currently in con-
troversy. The Economic Stabilization Act only supports impoundments
of pay raise spending and only when the action is incidental to the
imposition of broader wage-price controls. The Act is not a license to
make budget cuts whenever they are deemed desirable.
C. The Debt Ceiling
The debt ceiling is a potentially stronger foundation for impound-
ments of a broader scope, for the debt ceiling is a precise and specific
figure which may not be traversed. Thus, conflict with spending acts
might be unavoidable. At the time of the current round of impound-
ments, the debt ceiling was temporarily pegged at $465 billion.3 4 Its
temporary nature, however, must soften one's view of any presumed
unavoidable conflict between spending acts and the ceiling. If Con-
gress had not passed new debt limit legislation by June 30, 1973,111
130. Id. at 747-50.
131. Id.
132. Exec. Order No. 11615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15727 (1971).
133. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 747-48 (D.D.C. 1971).
134. See note 115 supra.
135. Legislation which passed just before the deadline extended the current ceiling of
$465 billion for another five months to November 30, 1973. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1973, at
1, col. 7. It was signed into law by the President on July 1. N.Y. Times, July 2, 1973,
at 43, col. 1.
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the ceiling would have reverted to its permanent level of $400 bil-
lion.136 The history of such legislation'31 makes it highly unlikely
that the Congress would permit an irreconcilable conflict between
mandated spending and the ceiling to develop, for new higher ceil-
ings have regularly been enacted as the old ones were approached.
But one need not make any such assumptions about possibl e future
congressional action to recognize that the debt ceiling provides no sup-
port for the current impoundments. The mere existence of a ceiling
clearly provokes no unavoidable statutory conflict; there is only con-
flict when spending causes the debt to approach the absolute limit.
The impoundments currently in controversy took place while the debt
level was at least $16 billion below the ceiling, 3s and thus derive no
support from the ceiling law. If Congress at some point allowed the
conflict to become pressing the President probably could not be
faulted for impounding to sty within the ceiling; still, faithful execu-
tion of the laws suggests that the President first seek out the spending
acts which themselves are written in the most permissive terms and
make the needed cuts there, or perhaps order an across-the-board per-
centage cut from all programs sufficient to meet the crisis. The debt




Whatever inherent constitutional power the President might have
to order impoundments is limited to those circumstances defined in
the Antideficiency Act where economies can be realized. He may im-
pound other funds only if he may rationally claim to be carrying out
the congressional will as it is fairly construed from the spending acts
involved. He is not entitled to use ambiguous language in the act as a
loophole for imposing his own intent, nor do spending acts by nature
inevitably permit a broad exercise of executive spending discretion.
The apparently conflicting congressional enactments invoked in sup-
port of the practice prove on closer examination not to conflict at all,
136. 31 U.S.C. § 757b (Supp. I, 1971).
137. Summarized in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4950 (1972).
138. See testimony of Deputy Attorney General Sneed. 1973 Hearings, supra note 5. at
366.
139. See the 1969 Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 20, in 1973 Hearings, supra
note 5, at 390, 395.
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or at least not in such a fashion as to justify the current selective im-
poundments. The President may be acting from the best of motives,
believing that these impoundments are the best way to deal with the
problem of inflation. His sincerity, however, does not empower him
to carry them out alone.140 Congress retains the power of the purse,
and to the degree that it states its spending intent with some clarity,
it may rely on the courts to enforce its will.
140. "The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does
not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave
within his power." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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